There is a great deal of terminological confusion in discussions of holism. While some well-known authors, such as Davidson and Quine, have used "holism" in various of their writings, 2 it is not clear that they have held views attributed to them under that label, views that are said to have wildly counterintuitive results. 3 In Davidson's case, it is not clear that he is describing the same doctrine in each of his uses of "holism" or "holistic." Critics of holism show a similar license. My aim in this paper, therefore, cannot be to provide and to examine a characterization of content holism that matches every use that has been made of the term. I aim rather to give a precise form to a holistic doctrine at one end of a spectrum of views that ranges from localism or atomism about content to holism about content.
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Let us call this robust anatomism. Robust anatomism seems to be a part of what is meant by holism, for someone who thought that, to have a meaningful expression or a contentful thought, one had to have two, would not usually be thought to be a holist. But it is still too weak to characterize accurately content or meaning holism, as even Fodor and Lepore show they recognize later in their book. 7 Meaning or content holism is not about how many items with meanings or contents there must be if there are any, but about the interdependence of the meanings and contents of meaningful and contentful items of certain kinds of systems of such items. Robust anatomism with respect to being meaningful or having content is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for meaning or content holism.
Let us try to state these doctrines now more precisely. Each has two elements. The first is robust anatomism with respect to the property said to be holistic, the property of having a meaning, or content, as the case may be. The second is that meaningful or contentful items come only in systems of such items, and that the meanings or contents of items in such systems are individuated in relation to the meanings and contents of other items in the system. In the case of meaning holism, the items are linguistic expressions, and the system of items we can call a language. In the case of content holism, the items are thoughts, and the system to which they belong we can call a person or thinker (I will use "person" as a stylistic variant of "thinker").
Crucial to our understanding of holism is how we understand "are individuated in relation to meanings and contents of other items in the system" in the above characterization. There are two things which need clarification here. One is what we mean by "individuated," and the other is what we mean by "other items." To take the latter first, two readings offer themselves: "some other items" and "every other item." I choose the stronger reading, "every other item," for three reasons. First, for terminological clarity, for it is this which the term "holism" suggests. If we take the other reading, the dependence of the content of a given item is not upon the whole system of items of which it is a part.
Second, I aim to characterize a view at one end of a spectrum of views. The characterization in terms of "some other items" will include views that fall between the two extremes, while not ruling out the extreme holist position. Thus, if we characterize holism in this weaker way, we will have left ourselves without a vocabulary to distinguish this more moderate from the more extreme view, and thus risk 4 rejecting a whole range of views on the basis of the rejection of the most extreme version of the view.
Third, as we will see, the weaker reading cannot be what is thought to have the standardly attributed counterintuitive results of holism. It is that view I wish to characterize and examine. What, now, do we mean by "individuated"? I will say that one kind of thing is individuated in relation to another if and only if the first is understood to be the kind of thing it is only in relation to the second, so that it is a conceptually necessary condition for an item to be a thing of the first kind that it be related appropriately to an item of the second kind.
With this preliminary, we can define meaning holism as follows:
[MH]
Meaning holism = df for every meaningful expression E, there is a language L, such that E is an expression of L, and (a) L has very many expressions that are meaningful (and nonsynonymous) and (b) the meaning of every expression in L is individuated in part in terms of the meaning of every other expression in L.
Correspondingly, we can define content holism as follows:
[CH] Content holism = df for every kind of thought K, for any K-thought T, there is a person P, such that T is P's thought and (a) P has very many K-thoughts (with different contents) and (b) the content of every K-thought of P's is individuated in part in terms of the content of every other K-thought of P's. I relativize the doctrines of meaning and content holism to languages and persons, respectively, for two reasons. First, it seems clear that the interest in meaning holism or content holism is not about whether there have to be very many languages (each of which might be atomistic), the meanings of whose expressions are interdependent, or very many persons (each with only one thought, perhaps), the contents of whose thoughts are interdependent.
Second, it is difficult to make sense of the possibility of distinct languages, or persons, the meanings of whose expressions or thoughts are necessarily interdependent.
It is evident that we can formulate many different doctrines about language and thought which may deserve to be called "holistic" by adding restrictions to our definitions. For example, we could restrict the doctrine of meaning holism to a particular category of linguistic expression, or exclude certain categories of linguistic expression. Similarly, we could restrict the doctrine of content holism to a particular kind of thought, e.g., belief, or perhaps to a broader category, such as propositional attitudes. We could, likewise, restrict the doctrine of meaning holism to a particular kind of language, 6 or the doctrine of content holism to a particular kind of thinker (e.g., to rational agents). The questions I will raise will be independent of these dimensions of variation. Therefore, I will restrict my attention to the extreme versions of the doctrines I have described above.
There are a number of doctrines about content or meaning that are sometimes called holistic that, it is clear, I will not count as such. For example, sometimes any view is called holistic which holds that one can have an attitude with a given content, or speak a language in which a term has a given meaning, only if one has some attitudes or expressions with meanings from a range of others with related contents or meanings. Such a view is more properly called content or meaning molecularism.
As I have urged, we must distinguish this view from views which genuinely make the content of a given item depend upon the whole of the system in which it is embedded. The content molecularist holds that contents come in groups, but not that every content of a thinker is relevant to the individuation of every other. 9 Nor will I count as holistic the view that in choosing an interpretation theory for another speaker one must evaluate interpretation theories as wholes, so that in theory choice the full range of assignments of attitudes and meanings is relevant to a theory's evaluation. The relevance of every attitude or meaning assignment to theory choice is derived from the fact that theory choice is a matter of the best fit with the available evidence. Thus, one must examine the full range of consequences of a given theory. A consequence of this is that each assignment of an attitude or meaning is relevant to the evaluation of an interpretation theory. But this shows nothing about whether the contents assigned are logically interdependent. The relevance of the full range of claims with evidential consequences to theory evaluation is a general feature of theory choice, and not specific to interpretation. It is no more relevant to whether contents of attitudes are logically individuated relative to one another than to whether comets are. 10 Finally, I do not count as holism the view that the attitudes "issue in behavior only as modified and mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without limit."
11
This point, that one cannot specify what someone will do without a full catalogue of his attitudes, in itself places no constraints on what attitudes an individual may have simultaneously. It is due simply to the fact that for any given set of attitudes which may issue in a certain action, one can imagine additions to it 7 which will result in a different action. The same point holds for any system which is not closed in the sense that it is not physically impossible for it to include additional causally relevant factors.
My main concern will be with what I am calling content holism, which I believe, despite the now apparently standard use of "meaning holism" in the literature, is the doctrine which most philosophers see as of central concern.
How we interpret meaning holism depends crucially on how we individuate languages. Let us say to begin with that a language is an abstract object consisting of a syntactical structure and an interpretation. If we place no further constraints on what counts as a language, then it seems clear that there are languages that contain only one expression, e.g., the language consisting of the ordered pair of <"dog", dog> (where the italicized word is used to specify the interpretation of the expression that is the first member of the pair). In this case, [MH] is false. In order for the doctrine to be other than trivially false, we must put further constraints on what is to count as a language. We could, e.g., insist
that by "language" we mean a compositional syntactic structure with a corresponding compositional semantics. This would ensure meaning anatomism for any language, and some interdependence among meanings of expressions in that language. 12 It would not by itself ensure meaning holism, for prima facie a compositional language need not be one in which every expression's meaning is individuated or depends upon the meaning of every other expression in the language. Meanings of complex expressions would depend on meanings of their parts in a straightforward way, but not in any interesting sense in the other direction, and there is no reason to suppose that the meanings of primitive expressions would need to be interdependent.
As long as we treat languages as abstract objects, it is difficult to see what grounds we could have for thinking meaning holism to be true, for in thinking of languages in this way, we are supposing that expressions and their interpretations are abstract objects that are independently characterizable.
What we would like to say is that a particular interpretation can attach to a linguistic expression only if that expression is a member of system of lingusitic expressions which have specific other interpretations.
A natural source for such constraints comes from thinking of how speakers are able to attach interpretations to linguistic expressions. We can say that by a language we mean any set of interpreted 8 linguistic expressions which a speaker can use in speaking. Our holistic constraint on the assignment of interpretations to systems of expressions will be spelled out in terms of which sets of interpreted expressions are such that all of their members can be simultaneously understood by a speaker, or such that the speaker can attach to each simultaneously the interpretation it has. Holism will require that for any interpreted expression, a speaker can understand it if and only if there is some set of expressions with specific other interpretations he also understands. More precisely:
[MH*]Meaning holism* = df for every interpreted expression E, there is a set S of interpreted expressions with very many (nonsynonymous) members of which E is a member, such that any speaker who understands E understands all and only the members of S or all and only the members of some set Why is content holism thought to be problematic? One difficulty with content holism that has been singled out is that it appears to make a scientific psychology of the kind we should like to pursue impossible. 14 Suppose that S is a person and Q(t) is the set of S's thoughts at t. I assume that thoughts are individuated by their contents. 15 [CH] entails at least the following:
For all times t and tN, and for all thoughts T 0 Q(t) and all thoughts TN 0 Q(tN), T=TN if and only if Q(t) = Q(tN). But content holism is problematic enough without its entailing content irrealism. In addition to its threat to robust psychological laws, it raises a host of difficulties for our understanding of the possibility of communication between individuals, of reasoning, of the persistence of the self, of memory -in short, of the whole fabric of our lives. It is a doctrine that is obviously false. Worse, I shall argue that it is incoherent. Its interest lies in the fact that while it rests at one end of a spectrum leading from content atomism to holism, the difficulties and puzzles it raises can be expected to shed some light on the difficulties and possibilities of occupying other points on the spectrum.
The difficulty I wish to raise for content holism is whether a content holist has the right to talk about a person having more than one attitude of any kind while also maintaining that we individuate the The disjunctive condition allows for the possibility of necessary links between distinct beliefs. For example, it allows that it is necessary that one believes that something is a giraffe only if one believes that something is an animal, while allowing that one has two beliefs; for it is possible that one believe that something is an animal without believing that something is a giraffe.
An immediate consequence of this criterion for counting beliefs is that the holist thesis about beliefs is self-contradictory. us see how we should extend it from belief to the other attitudes. Since the distinctions among attitudes of different types, such as beliefs and desires, do not depend simply on their content, we will not get the result from our ordinary criteria for individuating attitudes that holism entails that no thinker can have more than one attitude. The same content may well be entertained in different modes by the same subject, as in the case of the man who both desires that he be handsome, and believes that he is.
However, for each type of attitude, our criterion for counting that type of attitude is the same, mutatis mutandis, as that for counting beliefs. We can represent this criterion generally as follows, [3] and [AH](b) entail that no thinker has more than one attitude of any given type, which contradicts
[AH](a).
To avoid this consequence, a content holist must either reject our ordinary criterion for counting beliefs and other attitudes, or reject the characterization of content holism offered in [CH] . Let us consider a number of objections of each sort. First, we will consider objections to our ordinary criterion for counting beliefs. Second, we will consider objections to the characterization of content holism offered in [CH] .
(a) One could escape the consequences of our ordinary criterion for counting beliefs only by providing a criterion for individuating beliefs independently of their content. The thesis of content holism is sometimes expressed in terms of the metaphor of nodes in a network, the content assigned to each node being determined by the content assigned to every other node in the network. It is the use of this metaphor which I think has made it seem as if one could hold both that an individual could have very many beliefs or thoughts of a given kind, and yet the content of each depend essentially on the content of every other. The metaphor presupposes that we can identify the nodes, which correspond to the attitudes, independently of the contents of the attitudes. The hope that this metaphor can be cashed out is, I think, illusory.
Let us consider two ways of cashing out the metaphor. But what are these functional roles? They must be roles of the sort assigned to the standard psychological attitudes, on pain of changing the subject. We recognize two dimensions of variation in the functional roles assigned to psychological attitudes, that associated with its mode, and that associated with its content. For example, beliefs and desires, qua beliefs and desires, have different functional roles. These are functional roles that attach to an attitude in virtue of the mode in which a content is entertained. This difference in functional role, however, is no help in distinguishing between attitudes of a given mode. It will distinguish between the desire for a glass of water and the belief that it is raining, but not between the belief that it is raining and the belief that it is snowing. Thus, we must look to functional roles associated with differences of content within a given psychological mode. We want as many distinctions among functional roles as there are among contents. Otherwise, there would be no reason to think that the nodes we are characterizing are belief nodes. This amounts to saying that content can be exhaustively characterized functionally. This is, to say the least, dubious. But even if it could be done, it would be no help. The reason is that the project of giving a functional analysis of belief content is the project of reproducing in functional terms the distinctions which are criterial for our ordinary applications of psychological attitude concepts. This means that any successful functional analysis of content should have [3] as a consequence. In this case, we have obviously made no advance.
The second way to cash out the metaphor is to say that the differences between beliefs are syntactic differences, on analogy with differences between expressions in a language. On this account, different nodes in the network correspond to differences in the syntax of the states which correspond to the nodes.
This response deserves a fuller treatment than I will be able to give it in this paper. Here, I can, at best, merely sketch an argument. The argument has the form of a dilemma. Either differences in syntax must be explained in terms of differences in functional role, in which case this response reduces 15 to the first, or the notion of syntax employed is interest relative, in which case it cannot play the role of being the primary bearer of content.
The initial difficulty is that syntactical categories are not natural categories, by which I mean that they are interest relative categories. 20 This objection depends upon taking the expression "syntax" in this response literally. If we do not take it literally, then we must find some other way to understand it. It would be fruitless to try to spell it out in terms of physical types, since these are conceptually independent of psychological types.
This suggests that we spell out this notion of syntax, then, in terms of types which, while not explicitly psychological, yet are conceptually connected with psychological types. The most natural candidate (the only candidate that I can identify) is functional role. However, in this case, the appeal to syntax clearly reduces to the appeal to functional role, which, if it is to reproduce our ordinary notion of content, will reproduce the problems for the holist thesis entailed by our ordinary criterion for counting beliefs.
Stepping back from these particular suggestions, we can illustrate the difficulty for the nodes in a network metaphor by asking what the point would be of talking about nodes in a network once the holist thesis is granted. For if we grant the holist thesis, then in effect we grant that the unit of content is not the individual node after all, but the whole network. If the point of the metaphor of nodes is to distinguish different contentful items, we seem to have lost any motivation for talking about more than 16 one node. This can be appreciated by a consideration of the kinds of laws we could expect to have on the holist view. If any change in any assignment to a given node meant a change in assignment to every node, then the only properties relevant to psychological laws would be a properties of the whole network. Allowing for different networks for different attitude types, this is effectively equivalent to treating an individual as having at most one attitude of each type. We seem unable either to make, or to find any point in making, any finer grained distinctions, if holism is true.
(b) The second way of responding to the argument I have presented is to object to my characterization of content holism (while retaining its position at one end of a spectrum of views on content interdependence, so that it is not simply changing the subject). I will consider two responses along these lines. The first focuses on the force of the claim that content is holistic. The second urges a different conception of holism.
(i) The first response is that [CH] issues in a contradiction only if we take it to be a conceptual truth. If we take it to be metaphysically necessary, rather than conceptually or logically necessary, then it can be true, and, at the same time, we can employ our ordinary criterion for counting beliefs, since that depends not on metaphysical possibility, but on conceptual possibility.
The reply to this is twofold. First, this paper is concerned with whether content holism is a conceptual truth. This response grants that it is not, and so is not properly a response to the argument of this paper. Second, (i) makes use of a notion of metaphysical necessity that must be treated both as weaker than conceptual or logical necessity, and stronger than physical necessity. 21 It is obscure what such a notion of necessity comes to and obscure how to verify claims about such necessities. A more detailed response would have to wait on a clearer account of the notion of necessity at work here and how claims about it are verified or falsified.
(ii) The second response is that content holism is not the view that every thinker must have many thoughts and that the contents of those thoughts are individuated in terms of one another, but that having thoughts is being related to propositions, 22 which are not individuated in terms of one another, and that content holism is a view about constraints on the propositions to which one can be (for any given psychological mode) simultaneously related. 23 The idea is that the space of propositions can be partitioned into sets according the ones to which one can be simultaneously related by thoughts. If one is related by a thought (of type A) to any member of a set, then one is related to all and only members of that set (by thoughts of type A).
[CH*] For every type of thought A, for every proposition Q, there is a set of propositions S such that Q 0 S and S contains very many elements, and, for every person P, P has a thought of type A that relates P to Q if and only if for each y 0 S P has a thought of type A that relates P to y, and for any z ó S P does not have a thought of type A that relates P to z.
This formulation of the doctrine aims to avoid the original difficulty by individuating propositions nonholistically, and then individuating beliefs in terms of differences among their objects. Holism comes in not in the characterization of the contents of the thoughts, but in the sets of propositions to which one may be related simultaneously by thoughts.
In response, first, while this doctrine has some of the same results as [CH], e.g., on this view, no one can believe that p, come to believe that q, and still believe that p, it is not, I think, an accurate characterization of what is usually thought of as the doctrine of content holism. It is not about the content of any given thought depending on the content of any other; thus it is not a doctrine about the holism of content at all. It is a doctrine about the holism of relations to content. Second, all of the arguments for content holism that I am familiar with are (and should be) noncommittal on whether there are propositions at all, and on whether it is correct to analyze thoughts as relations to propositions, or anything else. Thus, the conclusion that such arguments aim at cannot have the commitments of [CH*]. 24 Third, it is not clear, in any case, that we will be able to offer a criterion for individuating propositions independently of beliefs. Ordinarily, we would say that a sentence "s" and a sentence "s*" express different propositions provided that it is possible for someone to believe that s and not to believe that s* or vice versa. 25 Thus, we would say that the proposition that p is a different proposition from the proposition that q if and only if it is possible for someone to believe that p without believing that q or to believe that q without believing that p. This is what allows us to distinguish propositions more finely than logical equivalence. However, clearly, if this is our criterion for individuating propositions, then, given [CH*], no set of propositions to which one could be related by a thought (of a certain type) could have more than one member. Thus, no one could have more than one thought of a given kind, which is the result we arrived at above. At the least, a content holist who took this line would owe us an account of how to individuate propositions that does not appeal to the possibility of believing one without the other.
To conclude, the basic difficulty I have raised for content holism is that our ordinary criterion for counting beliefs and other attitudes requires that any two attitudes of a certain kind with different contents be independent in the sense that it is possible to have at least one of them without the other, while content holism requires that one have many attitudes of any given kind which are not independent of each other in this sense. These two conditions cannot be simultaneously met, given our ordinary criterion for counting attitudes. which suggests that perfect content identity would require sharing all the same beliefs. But even these passages do not strictly commit Stich to extreme holism.
5. I will use "thought" to cover all varieties of attitudes or mental states which have or have associated with them a representational content.
6. In this passage we see Fodor and LePore using "content holism" to denote a claim about languages.
At other points they use "meaning holism" for the same purpose, and use both expressions to talk also about various doctrines about the interdependence of attitude contents. Since, as I will show below, claims about the holism of meaning and of content have different consequence, it is important to distinguish them and to use different labels for each.
7. See, for example, the discussion of the long and short scope readings of the definition of "anatomism" on pages 28-9 of Holism. The long scope reading is "There are other propositions such that you can't believe P unless you believe them." The short scope reading is "You can't believe P unless there are other propositions that you believe." Fodor and Lepore say there is not much interest in the short scope reading, and that this can hardly be the way holists intend to their view to be understood. They must be right, since this puts no constraints on the particular contents one must have to have a give content, and the dependence of content on other contents is surely where the holism comes in. They consequently endorse what they call the long scope reading as the intended reading of the doctrine of anatomism. It does not appear to me, however, that their original characterization of anatomism is ambiguous in the way they suggest it is, or that either of the readings they give of it are readings of it.
The passage quoted in the text is about linguistic expressions, not beliefs, and mentions only the property of having content. 12. By a compositional syntactic structure I mean a (non-empty) set of primitive expressions and set of operations on the primitive expressions for forming complex expressions out of them. We count as an expression of the language any expression which is a member of the set of primitives or can be formed from them by means of the operations. This ensures that a language with a compositional syntactic structure will have more than one expression in it.
13. It is easy to see why Fodor and Lepore, in Holism: A Shopper's Guide, while they seem clearly to have what I have called content holism primarily in mind, would not take care to distinguish these two 23 doctrines. Fodor's "Language of Thought" model for cognition encourages us to think of thought (to put it tendentiously) as more language-like than it is, and of the relation between a spoken language and the thoughts of a thinker as relatively transparent. Given the LOT hypothesis, it may seem that content holism reduces to meaning holism for the language of thought. There are two reasons for us not to assimilate them in this way. First, on Fodor's own account, the LOT model is an empirical hypothesis.
The present investigation is a conceptual investigation that should make no empirical assumptions.
Second, even given the LOT hypothesis, meaning holism for the language of thought is not equivalent to content holism, for essentially the same reasons as those given in the text for denying that meaning holism with respect to spoken languages entails content holism. We can fix the meanings of all syntactical types in the LOT without fixing the distribution of sentential tokens in the belief box, the desire box, and so on.
14. This is one of Fodor and Lepore's complaints against it, which shows that the holistic doctrine that they are concerned with is not equivalent to their sometimes official version of "quite a lot of that we have one proposition entertained in two different ways. Consequently, it would be urged, beliefs are individuated by an ordered pair of something like a mode of presentation and a proposition.
I do not endorse this picture, but I do not have to take a stand on it in this paper. If this picture were correct, we would identify the content with the ordered pair.
16. Fodor makes this suggestion, e.g., in Psychosemantics, in chapter 3, p. 55 ff., and claims that this view is widespread. However, he later denies that holism entails irrealism, and say only that it makes a scientific psychology of the attitudes impossible. Even this latter claim, I think, is too strong.
17. By "possible" I mean "conceptually possible" or "broadly logically possible."
